Servility and Destructiveness in Kazuo Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day*

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“Tell me,” I said, “when one surrenders his personal feelings to his professional feelings, may not the action be defined as a sort of spiritual mayhem?”

Jack London, *The Iron Heel*

Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel *The Remains of the Day* at first reads like a tragi-comic satire of a universe about to disappear, the world of the English aristocracy between the two world wars seen from the point of view not of the masters but of the servants. Two main characters occupy the front stage: a perfect butler, Stevens, who skillfully governs a large household (Darlington Hall), and his subordinate, Miss Kenton, the housekeeper. Trapped in his stiff role, conventional and strict to the point of denying himself the possibility of expressing his feelings and of opening himself to the love of a woman, Stevens comes to suspect—only at a very late stage of the novel—that real life, a full life, has passed him by. But there is much more in this novel than a traditional comedy of manners and a subtle tale of lost love, much more than a secretly ferocious critique, sensed by many readers, of a society capable of crushing human beings by its weight of conventions. Some of the commentators (e.g., Berth Soucar and Gregory Gipson) have also insisted upon the political dimension of the narrative, placing it in the tradition of post-imperial English literature (with the character of the butler seen as a symbol of the subjugated condition of the colonized peoples); I believe that this interpretation, one of mainly Marxist inspiration, misses the more direct political implications of the novel’s subtle and ambiguous character portrayal.

Ishiguro’s narrator refers to himself in the first-person singular, but the long monologue which structures the novel paradoxically questions the identity of the “I” (a concern that underlies many of Ishiguro’s works). Indeed, *The Remains of the Day* deals with a person who, for almost all of his life, has been deceiving himself in the name of a professional ethics of obedience set up as an ideal of “dignity.” Returning to himself and to his past only very late in life, he uncovers this deception and the illusions it has fostered. The initial alienating split between the human
being and his function is ultimately followed by the liberating split in the narrator, who suddenly becomes aware that his life has been a failure.

This self-division has been the object of scholarly comments pertaining to a salient issue in Ishiguro’s work (see, e.g., Phelan and Martin), that of narrative identity, in particular, the case of unreliable narration. I shall refer to this only inasmuch as it is necessary for the analysis of a major plot event whose ethical implications have not been studied.

The character of Stevens can serve remarkably well as an example of Sartre’s famous discussion of *mauvaise foi* (bad faith) in *Being and Nothingness*: the way in which an individual alienates his or her freedom for the benefit of his or her social function. Stevens plays this part perfectly, especially since his self-alienation is raised to the degree of a virtue. The structures of the ideological illusion, once studied by Karl Marx, work with a terrible efficiency for this perfect butler. More disturbingly, however, it is the ethics of “duty” and dignity that leads the protagonist to obey destructive orders simply because he accepts the legitimacy of the authority which issues them. Submission to authority has been studied by social psychologists such as Stanley Milgram, who has sought to understand how ordinary human beings could, in the days of the Nazi regime, become the executors of monstrous orders. Through purely novelistic means, *The Remains of the Day* makes a significant contribution to the analysis of the factors of destructive obedience.

**The Greatness of a Butler**

In keeping with common practice, Stevens’s master, Lord Darlington, only calls him by his first name. Stevens belongs to the élite of butlers as it still existed in England in the first half of the twentieth century. His entire life is devoted to a single goal—to be a great butler. Indeed, the world of servants also has its own hierarchy (footman, manservant, under-butler, butler) and its explicit and implicit rules. Stevens is driven by the sole and almost obsessive wish to attain perfect mastery of his duty, just like his father who, at least in his opinion, was one of the very few people to attain this goal — not owing to what Pascal would have called a natural greatness, a sort of gratuitous predestination preceding every merit, but as a result of lifelong effort and struggle. A natural gift does not suffice. Stevens is, in his own way, a modern man. He believes in a version of equal opportunity and does not think that only the established aristocracy deserves the services of a butler. His new employer, Mr. Farraday, is an American who has recently made a fortune; this does not
disturb Stevens, who boasts of not being prejudiced. At any rate, it is not the social status of the employer but the butler’s own quality deriving from a long apprenticeship that determines the greatness of the butler; it is a matter of education. On this particular point Stevens disagrees with the “reactionary” opinion held by some of his peers with whom he remembers having discussed these matters after the day’s work. One of the most important subjects of these discussions was precisely the question of what qualities constitute a great butler. The servants, who may seem subaltern and incapable of independent thought, turn out to be equal to the task of getting to the bottom of the problem.

They discover that beyond the external hierarchy of the functions and distinctions there prevails an internal order with its own secret laws. Obviously, only the initiated can appreciate these arcana, the diversity of opinions fanning the debate. As noted above, Stevens does not agree with what we may call the Jansenist notion of the predestined elite. Although he belongs to the caste of the initiated and has his share of privileges, he remains, despite or because of his esotericism, relatively open-minded, though he is trapped in his habits and shut off from whatever could turn him from his function, from the kind of man he wants to be and eventually becomes — “a man in a case,” like the protagonist of the eponymous short story by Chekhov.

Let us now return to the main subject of the servant-hall discussions—what constitutes a great butler? In other words, what can give greatness to a servile person, or, rather, to one who has a servile social and professional function? Would it not seem that greatness can only be reached if one leaves such a function behind? The current opinion that “greatness” can only be associated with freedom and conflicts with any kind of servitude, is a product of a moral-intellectual tradition—and Stevens is above all a man of tradition. Stevens, by his own admission, is no more than a servant: “I hope you don’t think me very rude. But you aren’t a manservant of some sort, are you?” . . . ‘I am indeed, sir’” (207). The idea of the “greatness” of a servant can only proceed from a profoundly alienated consciousness, a lost, mistaken consciousness which has introjected the reality and discourse of social domination. The servant-hall “philosopher,” who seems to have freed himself from his bonds in order to open up to the pleasures of intellectual speculation like those of free human beings, reveals that the reality of his servitude is not just material. That is why his argument proceeds from the very type of unreliable stance, of which, as demonstrated by James Phelan and Mary Patricia Martin, Stevens becomes only partially aware at the very end of the novel.
An Ethics of “Professionalism”

What quality constitutes the “greatness” of a butler? According to Stevens, it is one’s dignity in performing one’s duty, and “[d]ignity’ has to do crucially with a butler’s ability not to abandon the professional being he inhabits” (42). Taken to the point of perfection, greatness/dignity, thus defined, abolishes the separation between the professional person and the private individual, a split which, in the case of “merely competent” butlers, cannot but lead to a conscious role-distance when confronted with trials that highlight the fact that they are only playing a part. “For such persons, being a butler is like playing some pantomime role; a small push, a slight stumble, and the façade will drop off to reveal the actor underneath” (42). Inhabiting a persona with perfect professionalism makes the difference between enacting a butler’s part and being a butler. Only in the latter case is the person completely in accord with what he does, so that the distance between his function and his real self is abolished. As far as possible, the great butler has essentialized his duty to such a degree that nothing in his actions has anything to do with merely playing a role, or adopting an artificial identity:

The great butlers are great by virtue of their ability to inhabit their professional role and inhabit it to the utmost; they will not be shaken out by external events, however surprising, alarming or vexing. They wear their professionalism as a decent gentleman will wear his suit: he will not let ruffians or circumstance tear it off him in the public gaze; he will discard it when, and only when, he wills to do so, and this will invariably be when he is entirely alone. It is, as I say, a matter of “dignity.” (42–43)

This definition of dignity has been quoted more often than commented upon. Obviously, dignity is here not understood as a universal attribute that belongs to every human being by virtue of his or her being human; that is, the term is not used in the modern egalitarian sense, both ontological and moral, that can be traced back to the Renaissance, to the great works devoted to dignitas hominis (e.g., Pico della Mirandola, De Hominis Dignitate, 1486). Stevens’s notion of dignity is more in tune with the Romans’ understanding of dignity as respect linked to office or status. But Roman dignity was reserved for those holding the highest social positions (tribunes, senators, or generals) and no student of antiquity would think of using this term in application to a servant or see it as a capacity for living within one’s function with a perfect professionalism. There is thus something comical and absurd in the definition which is taken in all seriousness. Stevens is, indeed, often absurd or even comical.
When asked by a person uninitiated in his profession, a layman, in what dignity consists, he answers laconically, “I suspect it comes down to not removing one’s clothing in public” (210).

In Roman law, as it was codified, for instance, in Book XII of the Code of Justinian, “dignitas” was independent of the person who held the office — it was an image with which the person had to comply at all costs. Maintaining this image was often incompatible with love. This too seems to be Stevens’s predicament.

Read literally, the novel presents the unhappy consequences of a man’s inability to quit the social part which he plays and to which he completely adheres. Owing to his refusal to listen to what emanates from his personality, i.e., his feelings, his subjectivity, he is unable to welcome the possibility of love. To his own grief, he learns his lesson too late. The belated admission of Miss Kenton, the housekeeper to whom he has been living closely for many years at Darlington Hall and who, when they meet again after a long separation, alludes to the feelings she has had for him, opens his eyes to the missed possibility of a different life, a life of openness to another person, of affection, in fact of love — all of which might have compelled him to act like a man unmindful of his professional dignity. That possibility is not recoverable: Miss Kenton says that she eventually came to love her husband, although she had initially married him to flee the torments of her unrequited love for Stevens.

This can be seen as the key event of the novel — a revelation both touching and poignant of the illusory and specious nature of the ethics of dignity. When Stevens accidentally meets another butler on the pier of Weymouth port, he confesses that, unlike Lord Darlington, he is not even able to assume responsibility for the life in which he has gone astray:

Lord Darlington wasn’t a bad man. He wasn’t a bad man at all. And at least he had the privilege of being able to say at the end of his life that he made his own mistakes. His lordship was a courageous man. He chose a certain path in life, it proved to be a misguided one, but there, he chose it, he can say that at least. As for myself, I cannot even claim that. You see, I trusted. I trusted in his lordship’s wisdom. All those years I served him, I trusted I was doing something worthwhile. I can’t even say I made my own mistakes. Really — one has to ask oneself — what dignity is there in that? (243)

What is the nature of these faults? It is up to us to define what Stevens keeps silent about. Where does his inability to make his own choices stem from? Whence comes this absence of the self to the self which Stevens discovers only when he is no longer able to overcome its consequences
and when the most he can do by way of changing is to accept the “bantering” relationship that his new employer expects of him? The language of his confession both reveals and conceals the answers to these questions.

A Figure of Bad Faith
Many readers will undoubtedly have linked the figure of the butler portrayed by Ishiguro with the waiter described by Sartre in Part I, Chapter II, of Being and Nothingness. The difference is that Stevens would have made a kind of perfect waiter who would have suppressed all elements of playfulness and amusement in Sartre’s description of his character. I would like to suggest that Sartre’s waiter is analogous to what Stevens calls with contempt a “merely competent” butler. What distinguishes the accomplished figure from the one who remains on the side? It is precisely the latter’s playfulness, in the sense of creating a role-distance, that amounts to an inadequate way of identifying the private being and the professional character. Those who achieve this maximal identification with the office, to the point of eliminating all margins, all gaps, all playfulness, become the epitome of bad faith. The withdrawal of being (être) into what we are obliged to be (devoir-être), the identification of the “being in-itself” with “representation” (1992: 102–103), is what leads to the most extreme form of inauthenticity and unfreedom.

In a particularly illuminating 1997 article, Joseph Catalano distinguishes between a “weak notion” and a “strong notion” of Sartre’s concept of “bad faith.” The former is associated with the fact that in our social life we are forced to play roles and to pass ineluctably from one role to another. But it is when we volunteer to play a part and invest all our energies in it that the “strong notion” of bad faith leads to a radical negation of our freedom. Sam Coombes, commenting on this distinction, gives the following explanation: “If an individual not only passively accepts her social role but actively identifies with it, then it would seem that she is not just stoically bearing the burden of being inauthentic but willingly buying into a social value . . . which is, as it were, greater than herself, that is, which transcends her individual subjectivity. In Sartrean terms, she is fully subscribing to a freedom-limiting mystification.”

The butler Stevens is a type of the latter form of bad faith. His entire doctrine of dignity proceeds from the discourse of self-deception (see Marcus). Insofar as he not only plays the role expected of him but also theorizes it, turning it into an ideal—the ideal of dignity—his social and professional function is, as it were, essentialized as the quasi-Platonic
figure of the “great butler.” But whatever ontology is at work here actually effects a negation of the essential ontological basis of human beings—their freedom, which demands that a radical distinction be made between the private individual and the professional persona, so that they may always come back to their selves and heal their self-division. Stevens is not a subject; he does not just play at being what he has to be, adjusting to his social role whatever his objections to it may be while keeping a distance between what he is (a free conscience) and the part he plays. His case is that of one’s consciousness totally identifying with one’s function so that the latter appears almost like the being in-itself. If we imagine the waiter as being in-itself (être en soi) rather than “being what I am not” (Sartre 103), then this is how we can see the ideal of “the great butler.” But insofar as such an ideal can never be reached (because of the very structure of human conscience which can never attain, even if it is willing to do so, the dreary and impenetrable identity of that in-itself, of the inkwell, to use Sartre’s example [102], which is nothing more than an inkpot, the Hegelian immediacy of the object), bad faith is brought to its peak, at the same time as the total identification of the individual with his or her function inevitably fails. Stevens is simply at a loss about using what has remained of individuality. And this level of identification with the role, not perfect but extreme, is reached precisely because it is founded on ideological legitimation—the discourse of dignity, a salient feature of alienated consciousness, that theorizes its social state of servitude to give it the appearance and the guarantee of an intrinsic truth.

“Saint Stevens”: A Figure of Alienated Consciousness

That Stevens may be seen as a figure of alienated consciousness is apparent if one recollects the analysis of alienation proposed by Marx, particularly in The German Ideology. It is neither excessive nor gratuitous to interpret Stevens’s (pseudo-)philosophical discourse of dignity as an expression of the intellectual alienation of consciousness that Marx attributes to ideology — if only when this theorizing is separated from the concrete social conditions of servitude which it aims to legitimize. In other words, seen from this point of view, the discourse of dignity is deprived of universal applicability and reduced to the expression of a consciousness adrift in what Marx (16–43) treated as idealist nonsense mistaken for intrinsic principles. In fact, Stevens only internalizes the social rules concerning his status as a servant, rules that the aristocracy, the “dominating class,” has established for obvious reasons. Ideologi-
cal alienation is the intellectual (moral, philosophical, religious) camouflage of the reality of social oppression; it helps to dissemble and justify oppression by purely abstract representations (assumed to be true and universal) appropriated by people who are alienated from the material reality of their conditions of existence.

Insofar as he poses as the “perfect butler,” Stevens embodies the figure of a human being taken in his purely abstract and imaginary ideality, a figure that Marx criticizes repeatedly with both ferocity and sarcastic verve. And since he takes gibes at Stirner and Bauer by nicknaming them “Saint Bruno” or “Saint Max,” we might just as well follow suit by speaking of “Saint Stevens.”

With Marx, the criticism of the ideological phantasm in philosophy, morals, and religion is rooted in the principles of historical materialism and aims, ultimately and practically, at the achievement of a communist society. But Ishiguro’s novel is not informed by this “world-historical” approach and is free of the fundamental Marxist concept of “class struggle” leading to a revolutionary emancipation of the oppressed. Marx’s analysis of the illusions of alienated consciousness may provide an indirect comment on the way Stevens stands or rather loses himself in life, yet *The Remains of the Day* is not a Marxist-oriented novel. Its psychological exploration of economical and social alienation, seen from the point of view of one individual, overshadows the political implications in the Marxist tradition. Or rather, the political reading of this novel takes an entirely different turn: the novel shows how a person’s withdrawal into the function (“bad faith”), combined with the justification of that withdrawal (the ideological alienation), can lead to an obedience that is socially destructive.

**Obedience and Destructiveness**

Let us go back to an event mentioned in the novel almost in passing. In 1932, not long before Hitler’s coming to power, Darlington Hall hosts a secret meeting of several key figures of European politics who support a revision of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Lord Darlington, Stevens’s employer, sympathizes with the Nazis. The fact that Oswald Mosley, a notorious anti-Semite who was close to Mussolini, founded the British Union of Fascists, and led the Blackshirts, is among the guests clearly indicates the direction of Lord Darlington’s political ideas.

Darlington’s motives appear to have been more Quixotic than ambitious: he thinks that the way in which the Germans are treated, par-
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particularly by the French, is iniquitous. Furthermore, he is shown to be sincerely and ardently concerned with social issues, being in favor of an active role (Keynesian) of the State in helping the needy. Nevertheless, certainly under the influence of his far-right friends, he suddenly strikes out against the Jews. And though later he will come to regret this decision, not long before the beginning of a meeting in which Joachim von Ribbentrop is expected to participate, Lord Darlington asks Stevens to fire all the staff of Jewish origin. Two young maids, whose services have been completely satisfactory, are affected by this measure, which comes as a total surprise to the butler and of which he inwardly disapproves: “my every instinct opposed the idea of their dismissal” (148).\(^1\)

But the question is how those driven by the desire to always behave like a “great” butler should react under such circumstances. What kind of attitude is called for by the concern for “dignity,” that is, by the demand to inhabit perfectly one’s professional role without ever showing one’s personal feelings, the leanings of one’s inner self? Put in these terms, this question receives an unsurprising answer: the only possible attitude is complete obedience, entailing an immediate execution of any given order which can be neither questioned nor discussed. Indeed, this is the option that Stevens takes: “Nevertheless, my duty in this instance was quite clear, and as I saw it, there was nothing to be gained at all in irresponsibly displaying such personal doubts” (148). The housekeeper’s reaction is diametrically opposite to Stevens’s: when he informs her of “his lordship’s” decision, Miss Kenton threatens to resign if this decision is really put into effect.

Especially significant is the way in which Stevens replies to her disapproval and her refusal to obey an order which, she argues, is “simply—wrong” (149):

“Miss Kenton, I will ask you not to excite yourself and to conduct yourself in a manner befitting your position. This is a very straightforward matter. If his lordship wishes these particular contracts to be discontinued, then there is little more to be said.”

“I am warning you, Mr Stevens, I will not continue to work in such a house. If my girls are dismissed, I will leave also.”

“Miss Kenton, I am surprised to find you reacting in this manner. Surely I don’t have to remind you that our professional duty is not to our own foibles and sentiments, but to the wishes of our employer.”

\(^1\) Eventually, having broken with the “blackshirts,” Lord Darlington later realizes that what he did was “wrong” and that he “would like to recompense” these victims (151).
“I am telling you, Mr Stevens, if you dismiss my girls tomorrow, it will be wrong, a sin as any sin ever was one, and I will not continue to work in such a house.” (149)

Both the characters are aware of the evil nature of their employer’s decision. The difference is that one of them dissembles and represses his disapproval, clearly in the name of the pompously referred to professional duty (his “dignity”) whereas the other plainly speaks out against the evil. Later in the novel, however, the reader learns that Miss Kenton does not resign: in spite of the abrupt dismissal of the maids, she stays on at Darlington Hall, giving the butler ample opportunity to taunt her.

When Stevens complies with the iniquitous order without any discussion, thinking that it is unbecoming for him to contest its justness, his conduct is in conformity with his professional ethics, which consist in putting aside his feelings. Miss Kenton, however, can be seen as acting against her own principles. She openly expresses her indignation at the order as well as at the bland way in which the butler informs her of it (“Mr Stevens, I am outraged that you can sit there and utter what you have just done as though you were discussing orders for the larder,” 148), yet at the end of the day, though unable to announce the verdict to the maids herself, she allows it to be done without attempting further opposition, and without leaving as she has threatened to do. When later asked about her reasons for not resigning, she offers practical arguments (being without relations or resources, she would have had nowhere else to go) while at the same time confessing a moral flaw: “It was cowardice, Mr Stevens. Simple cowardice” (152). Evidently, she places the blame only on herself — at least not on the butler.

The episode thus suggests a union of a certain conception of ethics and the implementation of evil. The ethics in question is linked to a servile conception of “dignity” which alienates the subject from his own subjectivity. It is an ethics of the identification of the being with the function, a form of bad faith which completely reduces the private to the professional and allows no margins. As we have already seen, this is the difference between the “great” butler and the “merely competent” one. The latter plays a part, but keeps in his inner self a space for maneuver, for role-distance. The servant who has attained perfection in his profession, who acts with “dignity,” has locked up within himself any possibility of such a fracture. Yet the novel suggests that it is precisely in such a fracture, such “play,” that a truly dignified action would have been possible: an action that would have consisted not simply in expressing one’s disapproval but in following up on it. Both protagonists prove incapable
of taking such action. In an interview given to *The Guardian* (April 29, 1995), Kazuo Ishiguro explains: “I was interested in the way people lie to themselves so as to make things pleasant, and dignify their failures” (Jaggi).

The negation of personal feelings and, generally speaking, of the autonomy of the subject on which an individual can rely when refusing to obey an evil injunction is raised to the rank of a virtue or an obligation. It is not necessary to be more explicit about which regimes adopted this negation of sensibility and autonomy in the name of an inflexible ethics of obedience to the Leader down to his final sacrificial demands. Clearly, Kazuo Ishiguro has deliberately chosen to present Lord Darlington as a fascist, a sympathizer with Nazi Germany. And although the master of the house remains a secondary character, the political orientation of his ideas is anything but anecdotal: it places the human type embodied by the butler Stevens in a political light. Stevens is thus presented as not simply a silly laughable individual, trapped in his costume and unable to open himself up to the promises of love. Nor does he remain merely an embodiment of a philosophical notion, a figure of what Sartre called “bad faith.” Much more dangerously, he emerges as a servile and obedient person, all the more ready to follow destructive orders because he has elevated renunciation of the self, absence from his true self, ideologically, to the rank of virtue. He no longer elicits an indulgent smile if the servility he shows in executing an immoral command, an order of which he disapproves but which he forbids himself to judge and contradict, is read as subtly alluding to what Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem called “corpselike obedience” (*Kadavergehorsam*).

One well knows to what extremities of horror the professional ethics of obedience to orders can lead, especially when based on quasi-metaphysical foundations (whether a conception of “dignity” or the imperative of obeying the Führer, exalted as a “fundamental law”) demanding that one should put aside all supposedly “sentimental” or egocentric inclinations. This concern, prominent yet explored with discretion, gives Ishiguro’s beautiful novel a deep and lasting moral significance.

One of the most striking conclusions that Stanley Milgram draws from his famous experiments on obedience to authority is that the subjects who agree to send the maximum shocks to the “pupil” are not at

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2 See also Terestchenko 2005: 25–179.
3 Stanley Milgram conducted a series of experiments at Yale University in 1961–1962. “He found, surprisingly,” summarizes Dr Thomas Blass, “that 65% of his subjects, ordinary
all deprived of moral feelings (see also Terestchenko 2005: 124). Many symptoms attest to the unpleasant emotions they feel when obeying the orders to inflict suffering on innocent people, perfectly aware of the harm being done. All the same, they find a solution to the conflict between their conscience and the demands of authority, a solution in favor of the latter, believing in the legitimacy of acting out of a dismissal of their own singular individuality. The condition to which they have brought themselves, which Milgram calls the “the agentic state” (133) essentially tallies with the way Stevens fulfills Lord Darlington’s order.

We learn from experiments in social psychology that the ability to behave wickedly does not in the least require a malevolent disposition, the will to do evil, or the lack of ethical equipment that would allow people to understand the nature of their actions. Harming others results from the combination of the situational social factors and an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of authority which leads people to be absent from themselves, to abandon their true selves, to fragment and to partition their personality. Such partitioning is taken to the extreme by the perfect butler that Stevens wants to become, since alienation and self-depersonalization are based, in his case, on a rhetoric of dignity, all the more troubling in its potential effects for appearing in the guise of an ideal. Fortunately, if we believe Sartre, the ideal of perfect self-identification with one’s function, is never fully attainable. The withdrawal of être into devoir-être (even when it is socially and ideologically elaborated, as in the military ethics of virile courage, discipline, and blind obedience) never abolishes the distance between the en-soi and the pour-soi, in-itself and for-itself (Sartre 1992: 29), which constitutes human consciousness and the foundation of one’s irrevocable responsibility. No human being can therefore use the argument of obedience to authority, whether or not one may have agreed with it and made it one’s own, as an excuse for shunning responsibility for one’s own actions. It is this philosophical argument that the Court of Nuremberg relied on when charging and condemning Nazi war criminals. In his own particular way, not as a philosopher but as a novelist, and perhaps a moralist as well, Kazuo Ishiguro contributes to the analysis of

residents of New Haven, were willing to give apparently harmful electric shocks — up to 450 volts — to a pitifully protesting victim, simply because a scientific authority commanded them to do so, and in spite of the fact that the victim did not do anything to deserve such punishment. The victim was, in reality, a good actor who did not actually receive shocks, and this fact was revealed to the subjects at the end of the experiment. But, during the experiment itself, the experience was a powerfully real and gripping one for most participants” (www.stanleymilgram.com/milgram.php, December 20, 2004).
the moral ideology on trial, expanding its applicability to some of those who are perceived as pleasant and good-natured ordinary people.

Works Cited